L³ 君子好球誌

Translated By RaytheReds,

 

這是一篇由足球評論家Jonathan Wilson，在10/26發表於Guardian的文章。在下第一次翻譯足球理論類型的文章，自覺成果很差，但是這篇文章精闢的內容，又逼使著我不得不把拙作拿出來獻醜，大家多包涵。排版方式保留英文原文，底下對照中文翻譯，讀者可自行斟酌最合適的閱覽方式。

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The Question: Are Barcelona reinventing the W-W formation?

大哉問：Barcelona重新演繹了WW陣型？ 

  

To counter teams who sit deep, Barça push both full-backs up the pitch – echoing the 2-3-2-3 formation of the 1930s

為了對付收縮陣型在後場死守的對手，Barcelona把兩個邊後衛往前推，以加強進攻，然而這也和1930年代風行的2323陣型遙相呼應。

 

 Football is a holistic game. Advance a player here and you must retreat a player there. Give one player more attacking responsibility and you must give another increased defensive duties. As three at the back has become outmoded as a balanced or attacking formation – though not as a defensive formation – by the boom in lone-striker systems, coaches have had to address the problem of how to incorporate attacking full-backs without the loss of defensive cover.

足球是一個講求整體的運動。把某個球員的站位往前移，就必須將另一個球員回撤。給予某個球員更多的進攻責任，也必須賦予另一個球員更多的防守責任。自單前鋒體系大行其道以來，三後衛體系就被認為不是一個平衡或是具攻擊性的陣型，(不過倒沒說三後衛不是一個合適的防守陣型)，而教練們則必須思考，如何在不犧牲防守的情況下，賦予邊後衛更多的進攻責任。

 

 For clubs who use inverted wingers, as Barcelona do, the issue is particularly significant. For them, the attacking full-back provides not merely auxiliary attacking width but is the basic source of width as the wide forwards turn infield. The absence of an Argentinian Dani Alves figure in part explains why Lionel Messi has been less successful at national level than at club level. For Barcelona, as he turns inside off the right flank, Alves streaks outside him, and the opposing full-back cannot simply step inside and force Messi to try to use his weaker right foot. Do that, and Messi nudges it on to Alves. So the full-back tries to cover both options, and Messi then has time and space to inflict damage with his left foot.

像Barcelona這種使用錯腳邊鋒的球隊，此問題就顯的格外重要。對他們來說，進攻型的邊後衛不只是“輔助”打開場地的寬度，在錯腳邊鋒習慣切入中場的情況下，事實上邊後衛即是打開場地寬度的根本要素。阿根廷國家隊缺少如Dani Alves此一類型的球員，多少可以解釋Lionel Messi之所以在國家隊的表現不如在俱樂部成功的原因。在Barcelona踢球時，當Messi從右邊路向内切，Alves就會從他的外側往前推進，而這就使得防守Messi的邊後衛不能直接的站到內側，逼迫Messi只能用他的非慣用腳右腳來處理球。一旦防守球員這樣做，Messi可以巧妙的把球推給Alves。防守的邊後衛知道這個道理，所以他想要兩者兼顧，然而這就給了Messi足夠的時間和空間，可以用他的左腳給予對方致命一擊。

 

 It is the same if Pedro plays on the right flank, and the same when David Villa plays on the left. Barcelona's wide forwards are always looking to cut inside to exploit the space available on the diagonal, and that is facilitated if they have overlapping full-backs. Traditionally, if one full-back pushed forwards the other would sit, shuffling across to leave what was effectively a back three.

當Pedro在右側活動時，或是當David Villa在左側活動時，都可以套用和上述相同的邏輯。Barcelona的邊鋒球員總是透過內切，來創造對角線傳球的空間，而這也得益於他們的邊後衛有平行換位的能力。傳統上，如果一個邊後衛前壓，則另一個邊後衛便會留在後方，和兩個中後衛一起調整站位，形成一個有效的三後衛防線。

 

 Barcelona, though, often have both full-backs pushed high, a risky strategy necessitated by how frequently they come up against sides who sit deep against them. With width on both sides they can switch the play quickly from one flank to the other, and turn even a massed defence. They still, though, need cover in case the opponent breaks, and so Sergio Busquets sits in, becoming in effect a third centre-back.

然而Barcelona也經常讓兩個邊後衛都向前推進，這個冒險的戰術之所以有其必要性，是因為他們太常碰到對手收縮防守、擺出鐵桶陣來對付他們。當兩個邊路的空間都拉的相當開的時候，他們可以透過快速的邊路轉移，讓即使是人數眾多防守也顧此失彼。然而他們還是需要有保護措施，以免對手打防守反擊，所以Sertgio Busquets就回撤，成為名副其實的第三個中後衛。

 

 That, of course, is not especially new. Most sides who have used a diamond in midfield have done something similar. At Shakhtar Donetsk, before they switched to a 4-2-3-1, Dario Srna and Razvan Rat were liberated by Mariusz Lewandowski dropping very deep in midfield. At Chelsea, Luiz Felipe Scolari would often, when sketching out his team shape, include Mikel John Obi as a third centre-back. And Barcelona themselves had Yaya Touré dropping back to play as a centre-back on their run to the Champions League trophy in 2008-09.

然而這個點子，當然不是原創的。大部分使用菱形中場的球隊都採取過這樣的措施。Shkhtar Donetsk(頓涅茲克礦工，烏克蘭勁旅)，在還沒變陣成4231前，由於Mariusz Lewandowski回撤到中場非常靠後的位置，Dario Srna和Razvan得以被解放。在Chelsea，Luiz Felipe Scolari經常在畫陣型圖的時候，把Mikel John Obi當作第三中衛。而Barcelona自己也在2008-09賽季贏得Champions League的征途中，把Yaya Touré後撤以為第三中後衛之用。

 

 What is different is the degree. It is not just Barcelona. I first became aware of the trend watching Mexico play England in a pre-World Cup friendly. Trying to note down the Mexican formation, I had them as four at the back, then three, then four, then three, and I realised it was neither and both, switching from 4-3-3 to 3-4-3, as it did during the World Cup.

然而其中的分別只在於程度的不同。使用這個戰術的不僅僅是Barcelona。我在觀看Mexico對陣England的世界杯熱身賽中，首次注意到這個趨勢。在我試圖剖析Mexico陣型的過程中，起先我認為他們的後防線有四個人，後來我覺得是三個，接著變回四個，一下又變成三個，霎時我明白，其實後防線是三個也是四個，只是在433和343之間變換而已，他們在世界盃上也延續著這樣的戰術。

 

 Ricardo Osorio and Francisco Rodríguez sat deep as the two centre-backs, with Rafael Márquez operating almost as an old-fashioned (by which I mean pre-second world war) centre-half just in front of them. Paul Aguilar and Carlos Salcido were attacking full-backs, so the defence was effectively split into two lines, a two and a three. Efraín Juárez and Gerardo Torrado sat in central midfield, behind a front three of Giovani dos Santos, Guillermo Franco and Carlos Vela. The most accurate way of denoting the formation, in fact, would be 2-3-2-3: the shape, in other words, was the W-W with which Vittorio Pozzo's Italy won the World Cup in 1934 and 1938.

Ricardo Osorio和Francisco Rodríguez站位很靠後，是為兩個中後衛，而Rafael Márquez則擔任類似古典的(指的是二次大戰戰前)centre-half位置，站位只稍稍在兩個中後衛之前。Paul Aguilar和Carlos Salcido則是兩個邊後衛，所以後防線實際上被分成兩條線，在後的一條有兩個人，在前的另一條有三個人。Efraín Juárez和Gerardo Torrado坐陣中場，在他們身前的就是前場進攻的三叉戟Giovani dos Santos, Guillermo Franco和Carlos Vela。事實上，最能精確表示此陣型的，是2323。換句話說，也就是Vittorio Pozzo所帶領的Italy，在1934和1938連莊世界盃所使用的WW陣型。

  

P.S.以上文中有提到centre-half，跟現代足球的名詞有點差異，我摘錄Wikipedia上面的一段解釋：

In the early part of the 20th century, when most teams employed the 2-3-5 formation, the row of three players were called halfbacks. As formations evolved, the central player in this trio (the centre-half), moved into a more defensive position on the field, taking the name of the position with them.

在二十世紀初期，當大部分球隊採用235陣型時，其中有三名球員的那排被稱為halfbacks。隨著陣型的演化，位居這三名球員中路的那位球員(即是所謂的centre-half)，往更靠後的位置移動，承擔了更多防守任務，center-back的稱呼便由此而來。

 

Of the same species as Pozzo

與Pozzo師出同門 

Pozzo first latched on to football while studying the manufacture of wool in Bradford in the first decade of the last century. He would travel all around Yorkshire and Lancashire watching games, eventually becoming a fan of Manchester United and, in particular, their fabled half-back line of Dick Duckworth, Charlie Roberts and Alec Bell. All centre-halves, he thought, should be like Roberts, capable of long, sweeping passes out to the wings. It was a belief he held fundamental and led to his decision, having been reappointed manager of the Italy national team in 1924, immediately to drop Fulvio Bernardini, an idol of the Roman crowds, because he was a 'carrier' rather than a 'dispatcher'.

Pozzo於上世紀初在Bradford學習毛料製造業時，開始潛心研究足球。他跑遍Yorkshire和Lancashire只為了看比賽，最終他成為了Manchester United的忠實球迷，尤其對他們夢幻般的後防線Dick Duckworth, Charlie Roberts和Alec Bell傾心不已。他認為所有的centre-halves都應該像Roberts一樣，能夠傳出精準的長傳球給兩翼的球員。如此根深蒂固的觀念也促成了他日後的決定，在1924年重新被任命為Italy國家隊的主帥後，他立即捨棄了羅馬人的全民偶像Fulvio Bernardini，因為Pozo認為他是一個帶球主義者，而不是一個分球主義者。

 

As a result, Pozzo abhorred the W-M formation that his friend Herbert Chapman, the manager of Arsenal, developed after the change in the offside law in 1925, in which the centre-half – in Arsenal's case Herbie Roberts – became a stopper, an 'overcoat' for the opposing centre-forward. He did, though, recognise that in the new reality the centre-half had to take on some defensive responsibilities.

這樣的觀念深植Pozzo之心，結果就是Pozzo捨棄了他的摯友，Arsenal總教練Herbert Chapman，在1925年越位規則修改之後所設計出的W-M陣型。通常在W-M陣型中的centre-half，以Arsenal為例，這個位置上是Herbie Roberts，會成為一個攔截者、一個專門對位盯防對方中鋒的球員。雖然Pozzo摒除了這個陣型，但是他認為在新規則所造成的現實情況之下，centre-half的確必須承擔起部分的防守責任。

 

Pozzo found the perfect player for the role in Luisito Monti. He had played for Argentina in the 1930 World Cup but, after joining Juventus in 1931, became one of the oriundi – those South American players who, thanks to Italian heritage, qualified to play for their adopted country. Already 30 when he signed, Monti was overweight and, even after a month of solitary training, was not quick. He was, though, fit and became known as Doble ancho (Double wide) for his capacity to cover the ground.

Pozzo認為最能完美詮釋這個角色的球員是Luisito Monti。Monti代表Argentina出戰過1930的世界盃，但在1931年加入Juventus之後，他成為具有oriundi身分的一員，此係指南美洲球員，得以藉由在Italy俱樂部效力而產生和Italy的地緣關係，取得代表對他們來說算是“第二祖國”的Italy國家隊效力的機會。在年過而立被征召入國家隊時，Monti已經身材變形，即便經過一個月的自主訓練，他的速度仍舊無法提升。然而，他的體能依然可以應付比賽，並且他以防守範圍能覆蓋大半個場地而替他贏得Doble ancho(Double wide)的稱號。

 

Monti became a centro mediano (halfway house) – not quite Charlie Roberts but not Herbie Roberts either. He would drop when the other team had possession and mark the opposing centre-forward, but would advance and become an attacking fulcrum when his side had the ball. Although he was not a third back, he played deeper than a traditional centre-half and so the two inside-forwards retreated to support the wing-halves. Italy's shape became a 2-3-2-3, the W-W. At the time it seemed, as the journalist Mario Zappa put it in La Gazzetta della Sport, "a model of play that is the synthesis of the best elements of all the most admired systems", something borne out by Italy's success.

不像Charlie Roberts和Herbie Roberts，Monti成為了聯結前後場的中途之家。當對手持球進攻時，Monti便會後撤來盯防對方和他對位的中鋒；但當本隊持球時，他便會前壓，成為球隊進攻的發電機。雖然他並不是名義上的第三中後衛，但是他仍然比傳統的centre-half站位更靠後，而兩個inside-forwards也會回撤來支援三個half-backs裡面分站兩邊的球員。如此一來，Italy的陣型就變成了2-3-2-3，即是所謂的W-W陣型。這個陣型，套一句La Gazzetta della Sport記者Mario Zappa的評論：是一個集古今大成的陣型。Italy國家隊的成功皆要歸功於它。

 

 

Footfalls echo in the memory

跫音在回憶中響起 

To acknowledge that modern football's shape at times resembles the 1930s, though, is not to repeat Qohelet, the author of Ecclesiastes, and lament the futility of a world without novelty: "What has been will be again, what has been done will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun. Is there anything of which one can say, 'Look! This is something new'? It was here already, long ago; it was here before our time." Nor is it to argue that tactics are somehow cyclical, as many bewilderingly do.

要認清現代足球的樣貌，和1930年代極其相似這樣的事實，不應徒然悲嘆缺乏創造力的現代文明是多麼的空虛，並重覆Ecclesiastes(Hebrew Bible)作者Qohelet的話：已經發生過的，會再次上演；已經被實行過的，會再次被實踐；天底下無奇事。有什麼事情可以讓我們驚嘆道：看！這是個新玩意？太多事情都已經存在這世上太久了，遠超過我們的年代云云。我們亦無須庸人自擾之，去爭辯陣型的演進實是循環的。

 

Rather it is to acknowledge that fragments and echoes of the past still flicker, reinvented and reinterpreted for the modern age. Like Mexico, Barcelona's shape, at least when they use only one midfield holder, seems to ape that of Pozzo's Italy. Those who defend three at the back argue that, to prevent the side having two spare men when facing a single-striker system, one of the centre-backs can step into midfield, to which the response is few defenders are good enough technically to do that, and why not just field an additional midfielder anyway? What Barcelona and Mexico have done is approach the problem the opposite way round, using a holding midfielder as an additional centre-back rather than a centre-back as an additional midfielder.

相反的，我們應該要認清的是，歷史的遺跡和線索，仍然在點醒我們如何去創新和詮釋新世代的足球。舉例來說像Mexico和Barca的陣型，在他們僅僅使用一個控制型防守中場時，就好比是在模仿Pozzo的Italy國家隊。那些後防線上只使用三名球員的球隊，為了避免面對使用單前鋒陣型的對手時，己隊會有多餘的兩名防守球員，主張其中一名中後衛可以參予中場的組織；然而事實卻證明，僅有少數的中後衛有能力可以勝任中場的工作，倒還不如直接安排一個中場球員在場上？Barcelona和Mexico的安排正是反向思考此問題，用一個防守型的中場作為一個隱藏式的中後衛，而不是用一個中後衛作為一個隱藏式的中場球員。

 

But the style of football is very different. It is not just that modern football is far quicker than that of the 30s. Barcelona press relentlessly when out of possession, a means of defending that was not developed until a quarter of a century after Pozzo's second World Cup. In the opening 20 minutes at the Emirates last season when Barcelona overwhelmed Arsenal, the major difference between the sides lay not in technique but in the discipline of their pressing.

然而這也讓足球的理念截然不同。不僅是因為現代足球的節奏遠快過30年代，Barcelona在非持球時間所採取的持續壓迫防守戰術，即是在Pozzo第二次奪取世界盃之後四分之一個世紀才被發明。在上賽季Barcelona作客Emireates震懾且完勝Arsenal那場比賽的前二十分鐘，兩支球隊的高下不在於技術，而在於對於壓迫防守的執行程度。

 

Inverted wingers, similarly, would have been alien to Pozzo: Enrique Guaita and Raimundo Orsi started wide and stayed wide, looking to reach the byline and sling crosses in. Angelo Schiavio was a fixed point as a centre-forward – no dropping deep or pulling wide for him. The two wing-halves, Attilio Ferraris and Luigi Bertolini, would have been too concerned with negating the opposing inside-forwards to press forward and overlap.

同樣的，錯腳邊鋒對於Pozzo來說也肯定相當陌生。Enrique Guaita和Raimundo Orsi自始至終都在邊路活動，作用僅限於在兩個邊線上踢出傳中球。Angelo Schiavio也就是一個鐵柱子中鋒，回撤中場和拉到邊路都不是他的業務範圍。Attilio Ferraris和Luigi Bertolini兩個wing-halves，也肯定會被對手的inside-forwards竟然會前壓和交疊換位而感到迷惑。

 

Nonetheless, the advantages of the W-W for a side that want to retain possession, the interlocking triangles offering simple passing options, remain the same. Having Busquets, the modern-day Monti, drop between Carles Puyol and Gerard Piqué is not just a defensive move; it also makes it easier for Barcelona to build from the back. Against a 4-4-2 or a 4-2-3-1, Busquets can be picked up by a deeper-lying centre-forward or the central player in the trident, which can interrupt Barcelona's rhythm (just as sides realised after Kevin Keegan had deployed Antoine Sibierski to do the job, that – counterintuitively – Chelsea could be upset by marking Claude Makélelé); pull Busquets deeper, though, and he has more space to initiate attacks.

無論如何，透過採用W-W陣型，球隊可以獲得更多持球時間；陣型之中相互緊密連結的三角，也讓傳球選擇更加清晰明瞭。由Busquets，現代版的Monti，下沉到Carles Puyol和Gerard Piqué之間，此舉並不單純是防守考量；他同時讓Barcelona能更快的轉守為攻。但在面對採取4-4-2或是4-2-3-1的對手時，Busquets容易被站位很靠前的中鋒、或著是進攻三叉戟的中路進攻球員盯上，這樣就能擾亂Barcelona的進攻節奏，儘管讓Busquets站位靠後能讓他有更多空間來開啟進攻。

 

P.S. 不好意思(just as sides realised after Kevin Keegan had deployed Antoine Sibierski to do the job, that – counterintuitively – Chelsea could be upset by marking Claude Makélelé)，這段我實在翻不出來。

是1.大部分球隊也認識到防守中場這個位置可以成為進攻發動機，所以Kevin Keegan就把Antoine Sibierski放在這個位置；還是2.Kevin Keegan把Antoine Sibierski放到防守中場這個位置之後，大部分球隊就明白了。感覺像是後面那個對不對？

 

可是跟Makélelé這句又接不起來，儘管這句的意思相當明白：只要把Claude Makélelé盯死，Chelsea就綁手綁腳。而連結這兩句的“counterintuitively”這個詞是拼接而成的，由counter和intuitively組成。counter有交互的意思，intuitively按照Cambridge dictionary的英文解釋，是憑感覺而不依照事實根據就能理解某件事情。我試圖透過理解用這個詞而把前後兩句連起來，可是我失敗了。

連起來最順的翻譯也只是：在Kevin Keegan把Antoine Sibierski放在防守中場的位置上之後，其他俱樂部們就很自然的了解到：只要盯死Claude Makélelé，Chelsea就動彈不得了。

 

我只能說我大概懂他的意思，反正就是防守中場這個位置，實際上是進攻的核心。感覺括弧內的兩句，只是作者想透過舉兩個不同角度的例子來證明他的論述。Claude Makélelé本來就職司防守中場，但我沒有看過Antoine Sibierski比賽，故不能肯定我的假設。請各位體諒我的愚笨，為了以上這段文字，我搞了兩個小時，然後還是沒翻出來…

 

There is a wider point here, which relates to notation. Looking at reports from the early 70s, it seems bizarre to modern eyes that teams were still listed as though they played a 2-3-5, which had been dead for the best part of 70 years. Yet that, presumably, was still how journalists and their readers thought. Future generations may equally look at our way of recording formations and wonder how we ever thought it logical that a team playing "a back four" could feature fewer defensive players than a team playing "a back three".

還有一個重點，是有關陣型標示的問題。在檢閱70年代早期的比賽報導，讓身處現代的我們驚訝的是，當時隊伍的陣型還被標示成2-3-5，而此陣型在70年代實已幾近銷聲匿跡。然而我們可以得見，記者和讀者們都對此毫無疑問。日後的人們在檢視我們如何紀錄陣型的時候，可能也會同樣的訝異，並百思不解：為什麼我們這個年代的人們會認為，一支後場有四名防守球員的隊伍，實際上，可能比一支後場只有三名防守球員的隊伍，投入更少的防守兵力。

  

We understand that full-backs attack and that in a back four the two centre-backs will almost invariably play deeper than their full-backs, but the formation as we note it does not record that. Barcelona tend to play a 4-1-2-3 or a 4-2-1-3, according to our system of notation; heat maps of average position, though, show it as a 2-3-2-3.Barcelona, like Mexico, play a W-W, but not as Pozzo knew it.

我們都知道邊後衛的確會壓上進攻，而在後防線的四名防守球員中，兩個中後衛幾乎不可避免的會站的比兩個邊後衛還要靠後，但是在陣型圖上這個事實卻沒有被記錄下來。Barcelona傾向於採用4-1-2-3或是4-2-1-3的陣型，至少根據我們現有的陣型紀錄表他們是這樣；但透過熱區圖對於場上球員活動位置的分析，卻顯示出他們打的是2-3-2-3的陣型。Barcelona，就像Mexico一樣，打的是W-W，但卻不是Pozzo所認識的那套W-W。

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

以上文章原文請見：

http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/blog/2010/oct/26/the-question-barcelona-reinventing-w-w

以上圖片均摘自網路：

http://www.zimbio.com/

http://www.google.com.tw/